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Abstract
This paper develops an alternative to the standard framework of social welfare func-
tionals. In the standard framework, a social or overall betterness ordering is assigned
to each profile of utility functions, where utilities are real numbers. Different possibil-
ities for the measurability and interpersonal comparability of well-being are captured,
in this framework, by invariance conditions on social welfare functionals. But these
invariance conditions are highly restrictive and it is not clear whether they really fol-
low from the underlying measurability/comparability possibilities with which they are
associated.
The alternative framework developed in this paper cuts out the middleman of util-
ities, replacing them with the properties that utilities are supposed to represent. This
allows us to define the measurability/comparability possibilities directly, without the
use of any invariance condition, and to state social welfare functionals that violate the
standard invariance conditions without requiring inadmissible information. This sug-
gests that the invariance conditions cannot be justified in the standard way. But they
do follow from a simple principle that can be motivated by some familiar considera-
tions from the metaphysics of quantities. I conclude by considering the case for this
principle.
*I am very grateful to Matthew Adler, Krister Bykvist, Hilary Greaves, Harvey Lederman, Jeff Russell,
Trevor Teitel, Ralph Wedgwood, John Weymark, and an audience at the 7th Oxford Workshop on Global
Priorities Research for helpful comments.
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1 Introduction
Arrow (1951) gave us the following problem. Consider a set of (at least three) alternatives
X = {x, y, z, . . . } and a set of (at least two) individualsN = {1, 2, . . . ,n}. A preference profile
is an n-tuple of orderings on X, one for each individual. An Arrovian social welfare function
assigns a social preference relation to each preference profile in its domain.
Arrow wanted his social welfare function to have the following properties. It should
assign an ordering to every logically possible preference profile. It should respect the unan-
imous preferences of individuals: if everyone prefers one alternative to another, then society
should too. It should rank two alternatives by considering only the individual orderings over
those two alternatives. And it should not be dictatorial: there should be no person such that
society prefers whatever she does no matter what everyone else wants. But, Arrow showed,
these conditions are jointly inconsistent.
The most influential diagnosis of this impossibility is that it results from a lack of rele-
vant information (Sen 1970). AnArrovian social welfare function assigns a social preference
relation to n-tuples of individual orderings. This precludes any concern for cardinal infor-
mation and interpersonal comparisons. To accommodate such information, Sen offered a
generalization of Arrow’s proposal. Each person i has a utility function that assigns a real
number (“utility”) to each alternative, assigning higher numbers to alternatives that are bet-
ter for i. A utility profile is an n-tuple of utility functions, one for each individual. A social
welfare functional assigns an overall betterness relation to each utility profile in its domain.
In the socialwelfare functional framework, analogues ofArrow’s conditions can be stated
as follows. The social welfare functional should assign an ordering to every logically possible
utility profile on the set of alternatives. It should rank an alternative higher than another if
it is better for everyone. It should rank two alternatives by considering only the utilities as-
signed to those two alternatives. And it should not be dictatorial: there should be no person
such that what is better for her is better overall no matter what is better for others.
These conditions are consistent. This might be taken to confirm Sen’s diagnosis of Ar-
row’s impossibility theorem: in order to compare alternatives in an acceptable way, we need
more information than is contained in an Arrovian preference profile.
But how much information do we need? The social welfare functional delivers an over-
all betterness relation for each utility profile. So, it seems, we need to know the correct
utility profile in order to know the correct ranking of alternatives. Utilities, however, are
just numbers. There is no unique number that represents your well-being, any more than
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there is a unique number that represents your mass. There is no one true profile of utility
functions. For any profile that accurately represents the facts about individual welfare, there
are infinitely many others that represent the same facts just as well. Such profiles are called
informationally equivalent. Any differences between them are mere artefacts of the utility
representation,much like the differences between the kilogram scale and the gram scale. Ac-
cording to the requirement of informational invariance, the social welfare functional must
assign the same overall betterness relation to utility profiles that are informationally equiv-
alent.
The concept of informational equivalence and the requirement of informational invari-
ance lie at the heart of the social welfare functional approach. If the structure of well-being
is too sparse—in particular, if there are no interpersonal comparisons—then it becomes too
easy for utility profiles to be informationally equivalent, and we get Arrow’s impossibility
again. But when interpersonal comparisons are permitted, the informational basis becomes
rich enough for the social welfare functional to satisfy the Arrovian conditions. Informa-
tional conditions that allow for interpersonal comparisons can then be used alongside other
conditions to characterize social welfare functionals that represent natural ethical views such
as utilitarianism and Rawls’s difference principle.1
For at least some purposes, though, the social welfare functional approach is still too re-
strictive. The strongest kind of scale on which welfare could, with any plausibility, be mea-
sured is an interpersonal ratio scale. This is a scale on which there are meaningful ratios of
welfare levels between people: if person 1’s utility function assigns a number to alternative
x that is twice the number assigned by person 2’s utility function to y, then we can infer that
person 1 is twice as well off in x as person 2 is in y. Any two profiles that preserve these
ratio facts are informationally equivalent. But, even with this highly informative scale, the
requirement of informational invariance has highly restrictive implications (Nebel 2021b).
For example, when utilities can be either positive or negative, it rules out seemingly reason-
able theories that give priority to the worse off (Brown 2007). And, when population size
can vary, it rules out theories on which it is bad to add lives that are only barely worth living
(Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson 1999).
Some might argue that these views should simply be rejected, because they rest on im-
plausible assumptions about the quantitative structure of well-being—in particular, that it
can be measured on something stronger than a ratio scale. But the restrictive implications
1For helpful overviews of this literature, see d’Aspremont and Gevers (2002), Bossert and Weymark (2004),
Weymark (2016), and Adler (2019).
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are symptoms of a deeper problem. As Sen (1977: 1542) observes, the invariance conditions
are “unable to distinguish between (i) everyone having more welfare … and (ii) a reduction
in the unit of measurement of personal welfares.” If we take a utility profile and double the
utilities assigned to every alternative, the resulting profile could be taken to represent each
alternative as being twice as good for each person as it is according to the original profile,
or as being exactly as good for each person but on a scale on which the units are halved.
It is not at all obvious that these two possibilities should be treated the same way. But they
cannot be distinguishedwithin the social welfare functional framework because, asMorreau
and Weymark (2016) emphasize, utility profiles contain no information about what utilities
represent.
A further problem is that there is no way to define, within the orthodox framework,
the measurability and comparability assumptions with which the invariance conditions are
associated. The invariance conditions do not themselves provide such a definition: they
are, at best, necessary but insufficient conditions. This is observed by Levi (1990: 242, n. 4),
whowarns against “the error of supposing that the adoption of anX-invariant [social welfare
functional] presupposes assuming measurability–comparability assumption X.” One could,
for example, believe that interpersonal cardinal comparisons of well-being levels are possible
while accepting an invariance condition that makes such comparisons morally irrelevant. If
we want to know whether the invariance conditions really do follow from their associated
measurability–comparability assumptions, we had better be able to state those assumptions.
This paper offers a new framework that addresses these problems by paying closer at-
tention to the structure of the thing represented (welfare), rather than the numerical repre-
sentation of that thing. It cuts out the middleman of utility. This proposal is motivated by
a feeling reported by Field (2016: P-4): “[T]hough formulating an empirical theory using a
high-powered mathematical apparatus can in many ways be illuminating (especially when
it comes to comparing that theory with others), it can sometimes make it hard to see what is
really going on in the theory.” The apparatus of social welfare functionals has indeed been
illuminating, especially for highlighting the differences between alternative theories of wel-
fare aggregation and distributive justice. But it has obfuscated the issues ofmeasurability and
comparability that it was supposed to clarify. The point of my alternative framework is not
to remove utility functions and social welfare functionals from the ethicists’ methodological
toolkit (and it is certainly not to make any fragment of ethics nominalistically acceptable—I
will freely quantify over numbers and other abstract objects), but rather to ensure that con-
ditions stated in terms of utilities really do follow from the intended properties of well-being.
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We will see that the invariance conditions do not.2
This does not mean that the invariance conditions have nothing going for them. Indeed,
my framework allows us to pinpoint a simple, general principle that divides thosewho accept
and thosewho reject them. Ultimately, I think this principle can reasonably be rejected. But I
grant that, other things being equal, a theory that satisfies it is preferable to one that violates
it. So we get an account on which the standard invariance conditions are far from being
nonnegotiable constraints on meaningful social welfare evaluation, while also avoiding the
downside of making it inexplicable why we would have ever found them compelling.
2 Qualitative Social Welfare Functionals
Utilities are real numbers. A person’s utility assigned to some alternative is supposed to
represent how good, or valuable, that alternative is for her. The degree to which something
is good for a person is not a number, but a property—I will simply call it a value.
What are these values? I think of them as a kind ofmagnitude, much like magnitudes of
familiar physical quantities like mass and temperature. There are two main views about the
metaphysics of magnitudes. On one view, the magnitude 1 kilogram is just an equivalence
class of objects under the relation of being equallymassive (see, e.g., Kyburg 1997). Similarly,
one could think of a value as an equivalence class of possible worlds (or centered worlds)
under the relation of being equally good for a person. On another view, magnitudes are
Platonic universals or abstract entities of some other sort, which exist independently of the
things that instantiate them. Views like this have been defended by Mundy (1987), Michell
(1997; 1999), Eddon (2013), Swoyer (1987), and Peacocke (2015); Bykvist (2021) defends
such a view specifically in the theory of value. I prefer this second kind of view of values
and magnitudes more generally, but the approach presented here is compatible with views
2Another alternative to the standard framework is developed by Morreau and Weymark (2016). In their
framework of scale-dependent social welfare functionals, each utility function is pairedwith a scale that specifies
the possible utilities, a greater-than relation defined on these utilities, and an “interpretation procedure” that
specifies their meaning. But what are these meanings? Morreau and Weymark compare utilities to grades, the
meanings of which might be fixed by a rubric describing the conditions under which each grade is merited
(Balinski and Laraki 2010). But, when utilities are supposed to represent well-being, it is less clear how this
is supposed to work. We also want to consider cases in which welfare has more than mere ordinal structure.
But it is not clear how to distinguish such structures in the scale-dependent framework, since each scale just
contains a greater-than relation over interpreted utilities. The framework developed here may help to answer
these questions, thus complementing the scale-dependent approach, though in a way that renders utilities
otiose.
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of both kinds.3 Of course, it is not compatible with the radical (but respectable) view that
there are no values, instead only relations between value-bearers. This view would suggest
a quite different approach, to be explored in future research; here I simply set it aside. So
long as there are values (degrees of goodness, welfare levels, or whatever one wants to call
them) it does not matter for now how they are understood—though it may have substantial
implications down the road for issues to be considered in section 6.
Unlikemagnitudes of familiar physical quantities, however, I do not assume at the outset
that values can be represented by real numbers or have any quantitative structure. Nor do
I assume that they are interpersonally comparable. For each person i, there is a set Vi of
values for i. If these values are interpersonally comparable, then Vi = Vj for all individuals i
and j, in which case we use a single set V. Elements of V will be denoted by a, b, c, . . . , with
subscripts when not interpersonally comparable.
Each person has a value function vi(⋅)which assigns a value inVi to each alternative inX.
A value profile is an n-tuple of value functions, one for each person: V = (v1(⋅), . . . , vn(⋅)).
Each value profile purports to say how good each alternative is for each individual.
A qualitative social welfare functional is a function that assigns an ordering to each value
profile in its domain. I call it qualitative to distinguish it from a numerical social welfare
functional defined on profiles of utility functions. When there is no risk of ambiguity, I omit
the “qualitative.” I use ≽V to denote the at least as good as ordering assigned by the qualitative
social welfare functional to profile V. ≻V denotes its asymmetric part (strict betterness),
∼V its symmetric part (equal goodness). I assume that the domain of the social welfare
functional is unrestricted: it is the set of all logically possible value profiles.
To simplify our exploration of qualitative social welfare functionals, I restrict our atten-
tion to those that are welfarist, which means that they compare alternatives solely by how
well off people are in those alternatives. In the qualitative framework, welfarism can be
formulated as follows.
Given a value profile V and an alternative x, there is a list of values assigned by each
person’s value function to x: V(x) = (v1(x), . . . , vn(x)). Call this list a value vector. A social
welfare ordering is an ordering on the set of all value vectors. A social welfare functional
is welfarist just in case there is a social welfare ordering ≽∗ such that, for any profile V and
alternatives x and y, x ≽V y⇔ V(x) ≽∗ V(y). This property allows us to abstract from the
alternatives and simply consider their value vectors, which will be represented by boldface
letters (e.g., v) when considered independently of the alternatives to which they might be
3And with more exotic views, such as the “quantity spaces” view of Arntzenius and Dorr (2012).
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assigned.
A social welfare functional with an unrestricted domain can be shown to be welfarist in
this sense just in case it satisfies two conditions. First, if two alternatives have the same value
for each person, then they are equally good:
Pareto Indifference For any value profile V = (v1(⋅), . . . , vn(⋅)), and any alternatives x
and y, if vi(x) = vi(y) for every i ∈ N, then x ∼V y.
Second, the restriction of the overall betterness ordering to x and y depends only on the
values assigned to x and y:
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives For any value profilesV = (v1(⋅), . . . , vn(⋅)) and
V′ = (v′1(⋅), . . . , v′n(⋅)) and any alternatives x and y: if, for every i ∈ N, vi(x) = v′i(x)
and vi(y) = v′i(y), then x ≽V y⇔ x ≽V
′ y.
Pareto Indifference and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives are jointly equivalent to
welfarism as formulated above (for proof, see Appendix A).
In the qualitative framework, measurability and comparability conditions are imposed
by specifying a value structure, which tells us how the values relate to each other. In sec-
tions 3–5, I consider some value structures corresponding to different hypotheses about the
quantitative structure and interpersonal comparability of well-being that have been consid-
ered in the social choice literature. For each kind of value structure, I explain the associated
invariance condition and its implications. I show in each case how a social welfare ordering
that violates the associated invariance condition can be defined within that value structure,
suggesting that the invariance conditions cannot be justified in the standard way.
3 Ordinal Value Structures
Let us start with the simplest example of a value structure. Assume that different people’s
values are fully interpersonally comparable, so we need only work with the single set V.
There is a linear ordering⪰ onV, with the following interpretation: for any a, b ∈ V, a ⪰ b just
in case something whose value for a person is a is at least as good as something whose value
for a (possibly different) person is b. This is a linear ordering because ⪰ is antisymmetric: if
a ⪰ b and b ⪰ a, then a = b. I will assume that there is no greatest or least value: things could
always be better or worse for a person.
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I will call the value structure (V,⪰) an interpersonal ordinal structure. It allows us to
make (nothing more than) ordinal comparisons of different people’s values. We cannot say
how much better off one person is than another, or how much better for someone one al-
ternative is than another. Nor can we add, subtract, multiply, or divide values.
This informational framework is associated with a dilemma posed by d’Aspremont and
Gevers (1977). Suppose we strengthen Pareto Indifference to
Strong Pareto For any value vectors v = (v1, . . . , vn) and w = (w1, . . . ,wn): if vi ⪰ wi for
every i ∈ N, then v ≽∗ w; if, in addition, vi ≻ wi for some i ∈ N, then v ≻∗ w.
Define a permutation of a value vector as follows: w is a permutation of v iff there is some
bijection σ ∶ N→ N such that, for every i ∈ N, vi = wσ(i). According to
Anonymity If w is a permutation of v, then v ∼∗ w.
A person is unaffected in the comparison between two value vectors just in case her welfare is
the same in both vectors. The comparison of value vectors should not depend on the welfare
of unaffected individuals:
Separability For any value vectors v,w, v′,w′: if there is some subset M of N such that
vi = wi and v′i = w′i for every i ∈ M, and vj = v′j and wj = w′j for every j ∈ N ∖M, then
v ⪰∗ w⇔ v′ ⪰∗ w′.
d’Aspremont andGevers’s final axiom, in the qualitative framework, can be stated as follows.
A transformation φ ∶ V → V is strictly increasing iff, for any a, b ∈ V ∶ a ≻ b ⇔ φ(a) ≻
φ(b).Say that v′ = φ(v) iff, for every i ∈ N, v′i = φ(vi). According to
Invariance to Common Increasing Transformations For any value vectors v and w and
any strictly increasing φ, v ⪰∗ w⇔ φ(v) ⪰∗ φ(w).
d’Aspremont and Gevers show that a social welfare ordering that satisfies the (utility ana-
logues of) Strong Pareto, Anonymity, Separability, and Invariance to Common Increasing
Transformations must either be extremely egalitarian or extremely inegalitarian, in the fol-
lowing sense: when comparing two vectors, it must either give absolute priority to the worst-
off affected individual (leximin) or to the best-off affected individual (leximax). The proof
does not depend on any distinctive features of the real numbers that are lacking in the inte-
personal ordinal structure (V,⪰), so the theorem is valid in this setting as well.
The present framework provides a simple response to this dilemma: we can reject In-
variance to Common Increasing Transformations, even if we maintain that welfare is no
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more than ordinally measurable. We do not need an invariance condition to ensure that we
respect the informational constraints of an interpersonal ordinal structure. The standard
justification for such a condition is that a utility profile contains numerical properties that
do not reflect anything in the structure of well-being. For example, we can compare util-
ity differences, ratios, and sums across people, because utilities are real numbers, but these
comparisons are not “meaningful” when utilities just represent an ordering. In the present
case, however, there is no such justification. The value profile contains no superfluous infor-
mation. There are no operations analogous to the addition, division, or subtraction of real
numbers. More generally, there is no numerical representation, so there are no numerical
claims to be deemed “meaningless.”
To see howa socialwelfare ordering can violate Invariance toCommon IncreasingTrans-
formations while using only ordinal information, consider
Headcount-then-Leximin There is some value θ ∈ V such that, for any value vectors v
and w, v ⪰∗ w iff (1) the number of individuals for whom vi ≻ θ is greater than the
number for whomwi ≻ θ, or (2) the numbers are the same but the worst-off individual
in v is better off than the worst-off individual in w, or (3) the numbers are the same
and the worst-off individuals in v and w are equally well off but the second-worst-off
individual in v is better off than the second-worst-off individual in w, and so on.
Headcount-then-Leximin satisfies Strong Pareto, Anonymity, and Separability. It violates
Invariance to Common Increasing Transformations. But it does not require anything more
than ordinal comparisons.
It might be objected that it does require more than ordinal comparisons. It requires
there to be a “special level” θ. But this level is not designated as special by the interpersonal
ordinal value structure. We need not suppose, for example, that there is some level above
which a life is worth living, or below which a person is poorly off in some absolute sense,
or that has any other qualitative interpretation other than that assigned by the social welfare
ordering. It need not be represented by zero or any other number. We can suppose instead
that the level is either chosen arbitrarily or by satisfying our intuitions about the comparison
of alternatives. Headcount-then-Leximin says that there is a level such that it is always worse
for there to be more people below this level, but it does not require the level to be chosen or
represented in any particular way.
Consider an analogy. The Mohs scale is an ordinal scale of mineral hardness. A rock
collector might insist on having only rocks above a certain Mohs level. This does not mean
that they are treating the Mohs scale as more than merely ordinal.
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I think there could be reasons to rule out social welfare orderings that appeal to special
levels. I will discuss a way to rule them out, in greater generality than just imposing Invari-
ance to Common Increasing Transformations, in section 6. But they cannot be ruled out on
the grounds that they require more than ordinal interpersonal comparability.
Wehave seen that, in the framework of qualitative socialwelfare functionals, d’Aspremont
and Gevers’s dilemma can be avoided without using anything more than interpersonal or-
dinal comparisons. Let us now consider a sparser informational framework in which we
cannot make interpersonal comparisons of well-being.
Suppose that each person i has her own set of values Vi, and that Vi and Vj are disjoint
for any distinct i and j. For each individual i there is a linear ordering ⪰i on Vi, with the
interpretation that vi(x) ⪰i vi(y) iff x is at least as good for i as y. Define ⪰ as the union of
these n orderings. The value structure (⋃i∈NVi,⪰) is an intrapersonal ordinal structure.
Arrow’s impossibility can be obtained in this setting by adding an invariance condition.
Invariance to Individual-Specific Increasing Transformations For any value vectors v and
w and any n-tuple of strictly increasing transformations φ = (φ1, . . . ,φn) where φi ∶
Vi → Vi: v ⪰∗ w⇔ φ(v) ⪰∗ φ(w).
A social welfare ordering that satisfies Invariance to Individual-Specific Increasing Trans-
formations and Strong Pareto must be dictatorial: there must be some individual i such that
if vi ≻ wi, then v ≻∗ w. More specifically, it must be a lexicographic dictatorship: one vector
is at least as good as another just in case the first is better for some particular person (the
dictator) unless she is equally well off in both vectors, in which case it must be better for
some other particular person (the deputy dictator) unless she is equally well off, and so on
(Luce and Raiffa 1957).
But there is no need to impose Invariance to Individual-Specific Increasing Transfor-
mations to ensure that we are respecting the informational constraints of an intrapersonal
ordinal value structure. Here, for example, is a social welfare ordering (based on List 2001)
that requires only intrapersonal ordinal comparisons but violates Invariance to Individual-
Specific Increasing Transformations and is not dictatorial:
Headcount-then-Dictatorship There are values θ1, . . . , θn inV1, . . . ,Vn such that, for any
value vectors v and w, v ⪰∗ w iff (1) the number of individuals for whom vi ≻ θi is
greater than the number for whom wi ≻ θi, or (2) those numbers are the same but
v1 ≻ w1, or (3) the numbers are the same and v1 = w1 but v2 ≻ w2, and so on.
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This ordering violates Invariance to Individual-Specific Increasing Transformations and is
not a dictatorship. But it does not require anything more than ordinal, intrapersonal com-
parisons.
One might agree that Headcount-then-Dictatorship requires only ordinal comparisons,
but object that it involves some kind of interpersonal comparison. Once we pick a special
level θi for each person, we can say that some people are above their special levels while
others are not. But this is not an interpersonal comparison of different people’s well-beings.
Here is an analogy. We can pick a temperature and call it special—e.g., the boiling point
of water—and pick a mass and call it special—e.g., the mass of the standard kilogram. We
can say that some objects are below the special level of temperature while others are above
the special level of mass. But this doesn’t mean that the former objects are cooler than the
latter are heavy.
Again, I think there could be reasons to rule outHeadcount-then-Dictatorship and other
social welfare orderings that appeal to special levels. But the reason cannot be that it requires
information more than intrapersonal, ordinal comparisons.
Wehave seenhow the qualitative framework lets us avoid the impossibilities of d’Aspremont
and Gevers (1977) and Arrow (1951) without going beyond ordinal comparisons. Let us
now see how the framework sheds light on richer value structures, starting with the case of
ratio-scale measurability.
4 Interpersonal Extensive Structure
In order to construct a ratio scale, we need to enrich the value structure. Since we are assum-
ing full interpersonal comparability, we have a single set of values V and a linear ordering
⪰ on V. We also need a concatenation operation ○ that takes any pair of values in V and re-
turns another value in V. By “concatenation,” I just mean a way of combining things, in an
addition-like manner. A classic example, in the case of length, is the operation of stacking
rods together from end to end (Krantz, Luce, Suppes, and Tversky 1971).
How should we interpret this concatenation operation on values? If our values were
masses, many would be willing to interpret ○ as the operation that takes two masses and
returns their sum (as in Mundy 1987; Eddon 2014). Perhaps we have an intuitive notion of
addition defined on masses, which has properties much like the addition of real numbers,
and which we understand independently of empirical operations like stacking two objects
together on a scale. Somemight take themselves to have a similar intuitive notion of addition
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defined on values, so that a ○b = c can be taken to mean that c is the sum of the values a and
b.
Others, like myself, may not find ourselves to have any pre-theoretical grip on this no-
tion. Wemight instead try to assign ameaning to ○ in amore roundabout way, in terms of an
operation on value-bearers and only indirectly on values. Suppose that the bearers of value
are lives. Now imagine that an individual could lead multiple lives, one after another. For
example, you first live Napoleon’s life, and then Britney Spears’s (with your memory wiped
in between). We might then define a○b = c to mean that a life with value c for an individual
is just as good as leading a life with value a and then a life with value b. We then assume that
a person’s value function assigns some value to an alternative x just in case her life in x has
that value. I do not insist on this interpretation of ○, but it may be useful to have in mind
when considering the axioms of the structure.
There are well-known conditions, due to Krantz, Luce, Suppes, and Tversky (1971: sec.
3.2.1), that are necessary and sufficient for a concatenation structure to be representable by
real numbers, with concatenation represented by addition. Krantz et al.’s conditions, how-
ever, are too weak for our purposes. In the framework of numerical social welfare func-
tionals, the unlimited domain assumption guarantees that, for any real number and any two
individuals, there is a utility vector in which that real number is the ratio between those
individuals’ utilities. That ratio is supposed to represent how many times better off the one
person is than the other. So we do not just want each value to be representable by a real
number, as in the system of Krantz et al. We want each utility to be assigned to a value.
We want an isomorphism—a one-to-one, structure-preserving mapping—from the inter-
personal extensive structure (V,⪰, ○) onto the numerical structure (R,≥,+). For this sort of
result, we have to go back to the original system of Hölder (1901: Part I), whose theorem is
the basis for those of Krantz et al. The following axioms are a modification of Hölder’s:
1. ⪰ is a linear ordering on V.
2. V is closed under concatenation: for any values a and b there is a value c such that
a ○ b = c.
3. The concatenation operation is associative: a ○ (b ○ c) = (a ○ b) ○ c.
4. The comparison of two values is independent of common values to which they are
concatenated: a ⪰ b iff a ○ c ⪰ b ○ c iff c ○ a ⪰ c ○ b.
5. There is at least one “positive” value: a value a such that a ○ a ≻ a.
6. There is no smallest positive value: if a ○ a ≻ a, then there is a b such that a ≻ b and
b ○ b ≻ b.
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7. For any a and b, there exist (possibly identical) x and y such that a○x = b and y○a = b.
8. Consider any partition of V into an “upper” set A and a “lower” set C such that every
a ∈ A is greater than every c ∈ C. There must be a b ∈ V that is no greater than any in
the upper set and no less than any in the lower set.
It follows fromHölder’s theorem that if (and only if) the structure (V,⪰, ○) satisfies the above
conditions, there is a one-to-one correspondence u ∶ V → R such that, for any a, b ∈ V,
u(a) ≥ u(b) ⇔ a ⪰ b, and u(a) + u(b) = u(a ○ b).4 This representation is unique up to
similarity transformation—i.e., multiplication by a positive number. However, as Krantz et
al. emphasize, we do not need to use the operation of addition to represent ○. Consider the
alternative representation u′(⋅) = eu(⋅). Using this representation—which is unique up to
transformation by a positive power—u′(a) × u′(b) = u′(a ○ b).
In this structure, we can define ratios of values. For any natural number n and value
a ∈ V, define na as the concatenation of a with itself n times: e.g., 2a = a ○ a. The ratio
of na to a is n, which I write as na ∶ a = n. If for some a and b that are both positive or
both negative, there is no such n such that na = b, there might still be an n and m such that
na = mb—i.e., the n-fold concatenation of a with itself is equal to the m-fold concatenation
of b with itself—in which case a ∶ b = m/n. Otherwise the ratio is the limit of m/n as this
self-concatenation process yields a closer and closer approximation (as laid out by Krantz et
al., sec. 2.2).
We can now state the invariance condition generally associated with ratio-scale mea-
surability. Say that φ ∶ V → V is a similarity transformation iff there is some positive real
number r such that, for all a ∈ V such that a ○ a ≠ a, φ(a) ∶ a = r. According to
Invariance to Common Similarity Transformations For any value vectors v and w and
any similarity transformation φ,
v ⪰∗ w⇔ φ(v) ⪰∗ φ(w).
This condition is standardly implemented in the numerical framework by requiring the or-
dering of utility vectors to be invariant to common similarity transformations of utilities—
i.e., multiplication by a positive constant. But this is arbitrary: it only captures Invariance
4Hölder’s own system was restricted to positive magnitudes. But the conditions above imply thatV can be
partitioned into three sets of values: one that satisfiesHölder’s axioms for positivemagnitudes, one that satisfies
obvious analogues of Hölder’s axioms for negative magnitudes, and one containing a single “null” value that,
when concatenated with any other value, returns that same value. Simply apply axiom (7) to the pair (a, a):
there must be a value b that, when concatenated with a, returns a. This is the null value. Then apply (7) to the
pair (b, a), where b is null and a is positive: there must be a value c that, when concatenated with a, returns
the null value b. This is a negative value—a’s additive inverse.
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to Common Similarity Transformations given one particular convention for representing
concatenation, namely via addition. To see this, consider a simple social welfare ordering
that satisfies Invariance to Common Similarity Transformations:
Classical Utilitarianism For any value vectors v = (v1, . . . , vn) and w = (w1, . . . ,wm),
v ≽∗ w⇔ v1 ○ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ○ vn ⪰ w1 ○ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ○wm.
When values are represented by utilities and ○ by +, Classical Utilitarianism is equivalent to
an ordering of utility vectors by their sums, which is invariant to common similarity trans-
formations of utilities. But when ○ is represented by ×, Classical Utilitarianism is equiv-
alent to an ordering of utility vectors by their products, which (when population size can
vary) is not invariant to common similarity transformations of utilities, but is instead (unlike
the sum-of-utilities ordering) invariant to positive power transformations. Neither of these
should be privileged as the utilitarian ordering: each represents Classical Utilitarianism rel-
ative to a different numerical representation. Utilitarianism should not be understood as a
view about arithmetic operations on arbitrarily chosen numbers, but rather as a view about
the aggregation of well-being.
Invariance to Common Similarity Transformations rules out an important class of prior-
itarian social welfare orderings within an interpersonal extensive structure. A social welfare
ordering is prioritarian iff it satisfies Separability, Strong Pareto, Anonymity, and a further
principle that gives priority to the worse off, by favoring any transfer of a quantity of well-
being from a better-off to a worse-off person that leaves the former at least as well off as the
latter:
Pigou-Dalton For any value vectors v andw, if there is somepositive a ∈ V and individuals
i and j such that wi ○ a = vi, vj ○ a = wj, and vj ⪰ vi, and for all k other than i and j,
vk ∼ wk, then v ≻∗ w.
One example of a prioritarian social welfare ordering, as I have defined it, is the leximin
rule. This rule can be excluded by requiring the social welfare ordering to be continuous, in
the following sense. A neighborhood of a value vector v is a set that, for some positive value
ε, contains every value vector w such that vi ○ ε ≻ wi and wi ○ ε ≻ vi for every individual i.
Intuitively, it is the set of all value vectors that are within a certain distance of v. According
to
Continuity For any v and w such that v ≻∗ w, there are neighborhoods of v and w such
that, for every v′ in the neighborhood of v, and every w′ in the neighborhood of w,
v′ ≻∗ w′.
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This rules out leximin, according to which an arbitrarily small improvement to the worst off
outweighs any benefit to others. But, within an interpersonal extensive value structure, there
is no continuous-prioritarian social welfare ordering that satisfies Invariance to Common
Similarity Transformations.5
Continuous prioritarianism can be made to satisfy Invariance to Common Similarity
Transformations if the value structure is restricted to positive values, as in Hölder’s original
system. Such a structure would include the condition that every value, when concatenated
with any other, returns a greater value. But this condition is not very plausible. If ○ is in-
terpreted on the life-sequences model, for example, it implies that it would be better to live
your life and then a life in which you are tortured than to just live your life and die.
If we reject Invariance toCommonSimilarity Transformations, we can formulate a continuous-
prioritarian social welfare ordering within an interpersonal extensive value structure. Ac-
cording to











Kolm-Pollak Prioritarianism compares value vectors by taking the ratio of each person’s
value to a constant λ, applying a negative exponential transformation to these ratios, and
then adding up the transformed ratios. Nebel (2021b) calls λ a dimensional constant, af-
ter physical constants such as the gravitational constant: it is a value, not a dimensionless
number. This is a quantitative version of the appeals to “special levels” we saw in sections 3.
Kolm-Pollak Prioritarianism satisfies the continuous-prioritarian axioms but violates
Invariance to Common Similarity Transformations because the value λ is singled out as
special. If we apply a similarity transformation that moves some people above λ who were
previously below it, that can change the ordering. This example suggests that Invariance to
Common Similarity Transformations cannot be justified on the standard grounds that it is
somehow required for the social welfare ordering to based onmeaningful information when
welfare is at most ratio-scale measurable. For Kolm-Pollak Prioritarianism seems clearly
meaningful given an interpersonal extensive value structure, even though it violates Invari-
ance to Common Similarity Transformations.
It might be objected that Kolm-Pollak Prioritarianism requires something stronger than
5See Blackorby and Donaldson 1982; Brown 2007. The proof in Nebel 2021b can be easily translated to the
qualitative framework by replacing the utilities with values of the same “sign.”
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a ratio scale. The only kind of such scale is a so-called absolute scale, on which numbers
themselves are meaningful, not just ratios or other relations between them. The typical ex-
ample given of an absolute scale is counting: the number of protons in an atom is completely
unique; the only admissible transformation of this number is the identity. It is implausible
that well-being ismeasurable on an absolute scale. But there is no reason to think that Kolm-
Pollak Prioritarianism requires an absolute scale of well-being. The ratio of each value to λ
is indeed a unique real number, but this ratio is not a quantity of well-being; it does not be-
long toV. What is absolutely unique is not the numbers assigned to values, but rather ratios
between values. And that is true for any quantity that can be measured on a ratio scale.
5 Difference Structures
In this section, I consider value structures that allow for cardinal comparisons of some
form—i.e., how much better one alternative is for a person than another—but not ratio
comparisons. Unlike an interpersonal extensive structure, these structures do not require a
primitive concatenation operation.
In Part II of his paper, Hölder (1901) considered intervals of points along a straight line.
He showed that, if the ordering of intervals met various axioms, then one could combine
their absolute distances in a natural way that satisfied his axioms formagnitudes of extensive
quantities (a variation of which we saw in section 4). This sort of structure is the basis for
what Krantz et al. call difference structures, which give rise to cardinal (also called interval)
scales. In this section, I explore Hölder-style difference structures with various kinds of
interpersonal comparability, starting with the case of full interpersonal comparability.
5.1 Interpersonal Difference Structure
In a difference structure, the individual betterness relation holds between pairs of values,
which I call value intervals. I write the pair (a, b) as ab and call a and b its endpoints. It rep-
resents, roughly, how much greater a is than b, or the difference between a and b (though,
as we will see, this difference need not be represented by the arithmetic operation of sub-
traction). For example, suppose that these values are a rational agent’s degrees of desire
considering various possible lives. Then the interval abmight be interpreted as the strength
or intensity of such an agent’s preference between a life with value a and one with value b.
In an interpersonal difference structure, we can say howmuch better off one person is than
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another. We have a single set of values V common to all individuals, and ≽ is an ordering
onV×V. (It is not antisymmetric because two value intervals can be the same size but have
different endpoints and thus be distinct.) A rough interpretation of this relation is that, for
any a, b, c,d ∈ V, ab ≽ cd if somethingwith value a is better for a person than somethingwith
value b by at least as much as something with value c is better for a person than something
with value d. But this is only a sufficient condition, because ≽ can hold between pairs whose
first element is not better than the second. The more general interpretation will be clearer
when we see the axioms of the structure.
In the numerical framework, with an unlimited domain, ratios of utility differences can
be arbitrarily large or small: for any real number r, there are utility vectors such that the
difference between two people’s utilities in one vector is r times the difference between two
people’s utilities in another vector. This is supposed to represent the ratio between the two
value intervals. To obtain this property, I will assume that an interpersonal value structure
(V × V,≽) satisfies the following conditions, which essentially combine those of Hölder
(1901: Part II) and Krantz, Luce, Suppes, and Tversky (1971: sec. 4.4.1):
1. There are at least two distinct values in V.
2. ≽ is an ordering on V ×V.
3. Reversing the endpoints of intervals reverses their “signs”: if ab ≽ cd, then dc ≽ ba.
4. The intervals add up, in the following sense. Consider two value triples (a, b, c) and
(a′, b′, c′). Suppose that ab ≽ a′b′ and bc ≽ b′c′. Then ac ≽ a′c′.
5. Any value interval can be bisected into equal subintervals: for any distinct values a
and c, there is a value b between them such that ab ∼ bc.
6. Any interval can be “copied” elsewhere in the structure using any other value as an
endpoint: for any interval ab and value d, there are unique values c and c′ such that
cd ∼ dc′ ∼ ab.
7. For any partition of V into an “upper” set A and a “lower” set C such that every a ∈ A
is greater than every c ∈ C, there must be a b ∈ V that is no greater than any in the
upper set and no less than any in the lower set.
In this structure, we can classify intervals as positive, negative, or null, in the following way.
Any interval between a value and itself is of the same size: for any a, b ∈ V, aa ∼ bb. These
intervals can be classified as null. Value a is greater than b iff ab ≻ aa, in which case ab is
positive. a is less than b iff aa ≻ ab, in which case ab is negative.
The axioms of an interpersonal difference structure allow us to define a concatenation
operation ⊕ on the set of value intervals. This operation combines value intervals together
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to form larger ones (if both are positive). For example, if the endpoints were times rather
than values, and the intervals were durations of time, then ⊕ would take two durations of
time and return, intuitively, their sum.
To define this operation more precisely, let [ab] denote the equivalence class of value
intervals of the same size as ab. ⊕ takes any two equivalence classes of value intervals such
that, for some a, b, c ∈ V, ab is in the first equivalence class and bc is in the second, and
returns the equivalence class [ac], so that [ab] ⊕ [bc] = [ac]. The axioms of the structure
ensure that this operation is unique and well-defined for any pair of value intervals.
There is a crucial difference between the operation just defined and the concatenation
operation ○ of an interpersonal extensive structure. There the concatenation operation was a
primitive, ineliminable ingredient of the structure. By contrast,⊕ is defined using the axioms
above. Everything we say using ⊕ could be restated, though in a cumbersome way, without
that operation, in terms of value intervals.
The structure consisting of the set of (equivalence classes of) value intervals, together
with the defined operation⊕ and the ordering ≽, satisfiesHölder’s axioms for extensivemag-
nitudes laid out in section 4. This allows us to define ratios of value intervals, though not of
values themselves. Intuitively, the ratio between two value intervals (of the same sign) is the
number of times the smaller one would have to be concatenated to itself to be just as large
as the larger one. When there is no such natural number, there may still be a pair of natural
numbersm and n such that them-fold concatenation of the larger interval with itself is of the
same size as the n-fold concatenation of the smaller interval with itself—in which case the
ratio of the smaller to the larger is m/n. When there is no such rational number, then there
is a real number that is the limit of m/n as the stacking-and-copying process is iterated to
get the concatenation of smaller intervals to an increasingly close fit into the concatenation
of larger intervals. Such a ratio exists between any two (nondegenerate) intervals. I write
ab ∶ cd to denote the ratio of ab to cd as defined by this process.
It follows from the theorems of Hölder and Krantz et al. that there is a one-to-one cor-
respondence u(⋅) from V to the real numbers such that, for any a, b, c,d ∈ V, ab ≽ cd ⇔
u(a)−u(b) ≥ u(c)−u(d). And, given any such u(⋅), any positive α, and any β, the function
v(⋅) = αu(⋅) + β—a positive affine transformation of u(⋅)—will also represent the structure
in the same way. But, as Krantz et al. emphasize, we do not need to use the arithmetic op-
eration of subtraction to represent value intervals. Consider the alternative representation
u′(⋅) = eu(⋅). Using this representation, ab ≽ cd ⇔ u′(a)/u′(b) ≽ u′(c)/u′(d), and ratios
of intervals will be represented as ratios of log-ratios rather than ratios of differences. This
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representation will be unique up to transformation by a positive power and multiplication.
In the framework of numerical social welfare functionals, the invariance axiom associ-
ated with an interpersonal difference structure would require us to assign the same better-
ness ordering to two utility profiles where each person’s utility function in one profile is a
common positive affine transformation of her utility function in the other profile. In the
present framework, we do not have multiplication or addition. But we can define the rel-
evant class of transformations using our ratio operation. Say that φ ∶ V → V is a positive
affine transformation just in case there is some positive real number r such that, for every
distinct a, b ∈ V, φ(a)φ(b) ∶ ab = r. According to
Invariance to Common Affine Transformations For any value vectors v and w and any
positive affine transformation φ: v ⪰∗ w⇔ φ(v) ⪰∗ φ(w).
As explained above, however, this sort of invariance transformation need not be represented
as multiplication of utilities by a positive real number and addition of a constant.
Classical Utilitarianism (as defined on page 14) cannot be stated in an interpersonal
difference structure, because we do not have a concatenation operation on values. We can,
however, formulate a utilitarian social welfare ordering that concatenates value intervals,
using the defined operation ⊕. According to
Interval Utilitarianism For any value vectors v and w,
v ≽∗ w⇔ [v1w1]⊕ [v2w2]⊕ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⊕ [vnwn] ≽ [aa] for any a ∈ V
When value intervals are represented by utility differences, Interval Utilitarianism can be
represented by a numerical social welfare ordering that adds up utility differences. But, since
value intervals could instead be represented by utility ratios, Interval Utilitarianism could
instead be represented by adding utility ratios.
Interval Utilitarianism is the only social welfare ordering that satisfies Invariance to
Common Affine Transformations, Strong Pareto, Anonymity, Separability, and Continu-
ity.6 This is the qualitative analogue of a theorem due to Maskin (1978). We can assure
ourselves that Maskin’s theorem is valid in this framework by representing the value vectors
as utility vectors and helping ourselves to Maskin’s theorem in the numerical framework.
However, the case for Invariance to Common Affine Transformations in this framework is
6The statement of Continuity on page 14 appeals to the notion of neighborhoodswhichwas defined in terms
of concatenated values. But it can be straightforwardly translated in terms of intervals.
19
weak. The justification for its numerical analogue is that, when w and v are utility vectors
and φ is a positive affine transformation, φ(v) and φ(w) represent the very same distribu-
tions of welfare as w and v; φ is a mere change in scale. This is not so in the qualitative
framework. When w and v are value vectors and φ is a (nontrivial) positive affine transfor-
mation on values, φ(v) and φ(w) are distinct distributions of welfare; φ is a real change in
well-being. If there is a reason to rank φ(v) and φ(w) the same way as w and v, it cannot be
that they represent the same welfare information on different scales.
We can reject Interval Utilitarianism while satisfying Maskin’s other axioms within the
informational setting of an interpersonal difference structure. To see this, notice that we can
generalize Interval Utilitarianism as follows:
Generalized Interval Utilitarianism There is a value θ ∈ V and a strictly increasing func-
tion g ∶ V2 → V2 such that, for any value vectors v = (v1, . . . , vn) andw = (w1, . . . ,wm),
v ≽∗ w⇔ [g(v1θ)]⊕ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⊕ [g(vnθ)] ≽ [g(w1θ)]⊕ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⊕ [g(wmθ)]
For example, suppose g(ab) ∶ ab = 1/2 when ab ≽ aa but g(ab) ∶ ab = 2 when aa ≻ ab.
This would mean that values below θ get more weight than those above θ, unlike in Interval
Utilitarianism.
Some might claim that Generalized Interval Utilitarianism uses more than a cardinal
scale. The appeal to a special level θ looks much like what many authors say to establish a
ratio scale. Broome (2004: 255) claims to have derived a ratio scale of well-being from a
cardinal scale by specifying a level to call zero (see also Adler 2011: 216). But this is not a
ratio scale of well-being. It is a scale of well-being intervals from the chosen level. Even if the
chosen level has some significant properties that distinguish it from others, calling it zero
does not make it zero. By way of analogy, the temperature to which the Celsius scale assigns
the number zero has some physically significant properties. We could insist, if we wanted,
that any scale of temperature represent it with the number zero. But this would not entitle us
to interpret ratios or sums of degrees Celsius as ratios or sums of temperatures; they would
still just be ratios or sums of temperature intervals from the freezing point of water. As we
saw in section 4, we would need a richer value structure to havemeaningful ratios of values.7
7Generalized Interval Utilitarianism, like Classical Utilitarianism, can be used to compare vectors of differ-
ent lengths. This makes it suitable for evaluating variable-population choices—unlike Interval Utilitarianism,
which requires each person to have a value in both alternatives. The most obvious variable-population gen-
eralization of Interval Utilitarianism that satisfies Invariance to Common Affine Transformations is average
utilitarianism: one simply computes the average size of the interval from each value in one vector to each
value in the other. But average utilitarianism is not very plausible (see Parfit 1984: sec. 143). I take it to be an
advantage of my approach that it allows for a view that handles variable-population cases more plausibly than
20
5.2 Intrapersonal Difference Structure
Now that we have difference structures on the table, we can consider such structures without
full interpersonal comparability. In an intrapersonal difference structure, we can say how
much better x is than y for person i, but we cannot make any interpersonal comparisons.
The value structure for this informational setting is as follows. For each person i, take
the set of all i-value intervals: Vi × Vi. For each individual i, there is an ordering ≽i on
Vi ×Vi. Assume that, for each individual, the structure (Vi ×Vi,≽i) satisfies the axioms for
a difference structure laid out on page 17. Then the value structure (⋃i∈NVi ×Vi,⋃i∈N ≽i) is
an intrapersonal difference structure.
In the numerical framework, the inability to make interpersonal comparisons is charac-
terized by the following invariance condition: two utility profiles must be assigned the same
ordering if each person’s utility function in the one profile is some (possibly different for
each person) positive affine transformation of her utility function in the other profile. The
qualitative analogue of this condition is
Invariance to Individual-Specific Affine Transformations For any value vectors v and w
and anyn-tuple of positive affine transformationsφ = (φ1, . . . ,φn)whereφi ∶ Vi → Vi,
v ⪰∗ w⇔ φ(v) ⪰∗ φ(w).
But Invariance to Individual-SpecificAffineTransformations entails Invariance to Individual-
Specific Increasing Transformations. In an intrapersonal difference structure we can say that
a transformation φi on Vi is strictly increasing just in case φi(vi)φi(wi) ≻i aa⇔ viwi ≻i aa
for any vi,wi,a ∈ Vi. For any such transformation, there is a positive affine transforma-
tion φ′i on Vi such that φ′i(vi)φ′i(wi) ≻i aa ⇔ φi(vi)φi(wi) ≻i aa. So if two pairs of value
vectorsmust be ranked the sameway according to Invariance to Individual-Specific Increas-
ing Transformations, we can find a positive affine transformation to relate them, and so they
must be ranked the sameway according to Invariance to Individual-SpecificAffineTransfor-
mations. So, by Arrow’s theorem, Invariance to Individual-Specific Affine Transformations
and Strong Pareto together require the social welfare ordering to be dictatorial.
The standard lesson of this is that enriching the informational basis to include cardinal
structure without interpersonal comparisons is not enough to avoid Arrow’s impossibil-
ity. Unsurprisingly, I think this is false, because we do not need to impose Invariance to
average utilitarianism without requiring an interpersonal extensive structure with a primitive concatenation
operation on values.
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Individual-Specific Affine Transformations to rule out interpersonal comparisons of well-
being; such comparisons simply cannot be made within an intrapersonal difference struc-
ture. The following social welfare ordering (suggested by Nebel 2021a on behalf of Harsanyi
1955) involves no interpersonal comparisons of well-being:
Interval-Weighted Summation There are positive value intervals κ1, . . . , κn inV1×V1, . . . ,Vn×





(viwi ∶ κi) ≥ 0
Interval-Weighted Summation compares value vectors by adding up the ratio of each per-
son’s value interval between those vectors and some constant value interval (or equivalence
class of value intervals). This ordering makes sense given an intrapersonal difference struc-
ture, but it does not satisfy Invariance to Individual-Specific Affine Transformations.
5.3 Hybrid Difference Structure
In what I will call a hybrid difference structure, we can compare different people’s gains and
losses in welfare (value intervals), but not their welfare levels (values). This informational
setting (which is often called “cardinal unit comparability”) is used in d’Aspremont andGev-
ers (1977)’s axiomatic characterization of utilitarianism. They show that the utilitarian so-
cial welfare ordering is the only one that satisfies the utility-theoretic versions of Strong
Pareto, Anonymity, and an invariance condition that requires two pairs of utility vectors to
be ranked the same way if they are related by a positive affine transformation whose scale
factor is the same for each person (the translations can differ by person).
Structures of this sort have been studied by Krantz et al., who call them cross-modality
ordering structures (Krantz, Luce, Suppes, and Tversky 1971: sec. 4.6). Their experimental
application involves subjects matching different kinds of paired sensations—e.g., matching
a pair of sounds with respect to their loudness with a pair of lights with respect to their
brightness—without ever comparing two sensations of different kinds.
A possible analogue in the theory of welfare might be the comparison of preference in-
tensities. It seems to make sense to say that my preference to keep my job rather than lose
it is stronger than someone’s preference to have chocolate rather than vanilla ice cream. But
one might doubt that there are interpersonally comparable “levels” underlying these com-
parisons of preference intensities. Utterances like “I want to keep my job more than you
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want to have chocolate ice cream” might seem to compare monadic desires in terms of their
strengths, but the truth conditions for such utterances may be best understood in terms of
comparisons of dyadic preference strengths (Greaves and Lederman 2016: 29, n. 25).
A hybrid difference structure has the same base set as an intrapersonal difference struc-
ture: ⋃i∈NVi × Vi. But, unlike in an intrapersonal difference structure, we have a single
ordering ≽ on this base set: the structure is (⋃i∈NVi ×Vi,≽). So intervals between my val-
ues must be comparable to intervals between your values, but there is no comparison of my
values to your values.
Assume that the restriction of a hybrid difference structure to each individual’s set of
value intervals satisfies the difference structure axioms stated on page 17. Also assume that,
for any individual i and values aibi ∈ Vi, and any individual j, there are values ajbj ∈ Vj
such that aibi ∼ ajbj. This is enough to define a concatenation operation ⊕: ⊕ takes any two
equivalence classes of value intervals such that, for some ai, bi, ci ∈ ⋃i∈NVi ×Vi, aibi is in the
first equivalence class and bici is in the second, and returns the equivalence class [aici], so
that [aibi]⊕ [bici] = [aici]. So Interval Utilitarianism makes sense in this structure.
In empirical applications, the intervals in a cross-modality ordering structure are con-
ventionally represented by ratios rather than differences. There are functions u1, . . . ,un
from V1, . . . ,Vn to the positive real numbers, such that ui(ai)/ui(bi) ≥ uj(a′j)/uj(b′j) iff
aibi ≽ a′jb′j . The representation is unique up to transformation by a common positive power
for all individuals and multiplication by positive numbers that can differ by individuals. As
we have seen, there is nothing special about representation by ratios or representation by
differences. But it suggests that it is not pedantic to complain about the practice, in the nu-
merical framework, of characterizing each informational basis in terms of a single privileged
invariance condition. Whether or not two utility profiles are informationally equivalent de-
pends on what arithmetic operations such as subtraction are supposed to represent. And,
for that, we need to specify a value structure.
Given a hybrid difference structure, we can state the qualitative analogue of d’Aspremont
and Gevers (1977)’s invariance condition as follows.
Invariance to Affine Transformations with Common Scale Factors For any value vectors
v and w and any n-tuple of positive affine transformations φ = (φ1, . . . ,φn) where
φi ∶ Vi → Vi and [φi(ai)φi(bi) ∶ (aibi)] = [φj(a′j)φj(b′j) ∶ (a′jb′j)] for every i, j ∈ N ∶ v ⪰∗
w⇔ φ(v) ⪰∗ φ(w).
The qualitative analogue of d’Aspremont and Gevers (1977)’s theorem also requires a differ-
ent anonymity principle. This is because Anonymity (as stated on page 8) is trivial when the
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value structure is a hybrid difference structure: the only permutation of a value vector is the
identity. We need a stronger anonymity principle that allows us to rearrange value intervals
without requiring us to rearrange values. According to
Interval Anonymity For any value vectors v, v′,w,w′: if there is some bijection σ ∶ N→ N
such that, for every i ∈ N, viwi ∼ v′σ(i)w′σ(i), then v ≽∗ w⇔ v′ ≽∗ w′.
However, Interval Anonymity wouldmake Invariance to Affine Transformations with Com-
mon Scale Factors redundant in a characterization of Interval Utilitarianism. For, as I show
in Appendix B, Interval Anonymity and Strong Pareto are together sufficient to obtain In-
terval Utilitarianism.
d’Aspremont and Gevers’s theorem may have seemed to provide a compelling argument
for utilitarianism on the assumption that we canmake interpersonal comparisons of welfare
gains and losses but not of levels, as in a hybrid difference structure. But when we translate
these premises to the qualitative framework, the argument seems much less compelling,
since it requires Anonymity to be strengthened to a premise that is nearly equivalent to the
desired conclusion.
Here is an example of a non-utilitarian social welfare ordering that can be formulated
using a hybrid difference structure, based on the generalized Gini family (Weymark 1981).
For each individual i, pick a value θi ∈ Vi. Given any vector v, we rank the individuals by the
size of the interval viθi, as ordered by ≽. Then each person’s interval from θi is “multiplied”
by a positive number a(i) that depends on i’s rank, giving priority to those further down
the rank ordering. The qualitative interpretation of this multiplication is that an interval is
mapped onto one that is a(i) times bigger. We then concatenate these rank-weighted inter-
vals. We then perform the same operation on w, and compare the resulting concatenations
of rank-weighted intervals. This social welfare ordering looks formally egalitarian, but it is
not egalitarian, because we cannot say that anyone is better or worse off than anyone else.
We can only say that one person i is better off than her level θi by more than another person
j is better off than his θj.
6 Automorphism Invariance
We have now seen how each of the standard invariance conditions can be rejected within
the qualitative framework. In each case, the social welfare ordering has to single out a value
or interval in the value structure. This strategy does not seem to require any information
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that is not available in the value structures under consideration. Nor does it seem to involve
any numerical claims that might plausibly be considered “meaningless.” So, in the qualita-
tive framework, the invariance conditions cannot be justified on the standard grounds. And
they lack the immediate plausibility they seemed to enjoy in the numerical framework. In-
variance to Common Similarity Transformations, for example, does not have anything to do
with the informational equivalence of utility profiles related by a similarity transformation.
It says, when combined with the welfarism axioms, that if x′ is twice as good for each person
as x and y′ is twice as good for each person as y, then x is at least as good as y iff x′ is at least
as good as y. This is a real change in well-being, not a merely representational change in the
unit of measurement.
This does not mean that the invariance conditions cannot be justified at all. I want to
conclude by asking how theymight be restored within the qualitative framework. Of course,
one could simply insist, of each such condition, that it is true. But, intuitively, if any of the
invariance conditions is true, it is true in virtue of somemore general principle that rules out
any appeal to special values or intervals. Identifying such a principle will help us to better
understand the disagreement over these conditions. It will also provide another advantage
of the qualitative approach, since it would seem desirable to have a framework that is, by
itself, neutral about the conditions under debate.
An important strand in the theory of measurement studies the properties of relational
structures in terms of their automorphisms (Luce, Krantz, Suppes, and Tversky 2014; Narens
2002). An automorphism is a one-to-one mapping of a structure onto itself that preserves
all of the relations in the structure. For example, if we take each value in an interpersonal
extensive structure map it to the value that would result from concatenating the value with
itself n times—a similarity transformation—the structure stays the same: same set of values,
same ordering over these values, and same concatenation operation. Similarly, if we take
each interval in an interpersonal difference structure and map it onto one that is n times
bigger—a positive affine transformation—the structure stays the same. More generally, the
transformations identified by the standard invariance conditions are automorphisms of their
associated value structures. So the violations of these invariance conditions can be ruled out
by
Automorphism Invariance If two value profiles are related by a transformation that is an
automorphism of the value structure, then they must be assigned the same overall
betterness ordering.
Given the welfarism axioms, Automorphism Invariance implies the analogous condition for
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the social welfare ordering on value vectors: if two pairs of value vectors are related by an
automorphism of the value structure, then they must be compared in the same way. This
means that, whatever the value structure is, the social welfare functional must satisfy the
invariance condition associated with that structure—e.g., Invariance to Common Similarity
Transformations for an interpersonal extensive structure.
Why might we accept Automorphism Invariance? One reason is an epistemic worry
about social welfare functionals that violate Automorphism Invariance. Suppose we want to
know the correct ordering of alternatives. Then we need to know the correct value profile—
the one in which each person’s value function assigns the value to each alternative that it
actually has. Now suppose that profiles V and V′ are related by an automorphism of the
value structure. Suppose, for example, that the value structure is an interpersonal differ-
ence structure, and that they are related by a positive affine transformation: according to
V′, everyone is better off in each alternative, by a common interval, than V says they are.
How could we possibly tell whether V or V′ is correct? One might argue that we cannot
distinguish between profiles that are related by an automorphism of the value structure, on
the grounds that we can only tell how well off a person is in some alternative by compar-
ison to other alternatives or other people. We cannot, on this view, discriminate between
possibilities in which the values assigned to every alternative for every person are related
by an automorphism of the value structure. So, if Automorphism Invariance were false, the
correct ordering of alternatives would be unknowable. For any profile that could be accurate
given our evidence, there will be one that is indistinguishable from it but to which the social
welfare functional assigns a different ordering of alternatives.
This does not particularly bother me, since I see no reason to think that the correct or-
dering of alternatives must be knowable by us. It would be more disturbing if the ordering
of any pair of alternatives were unknowable. But that would not follow from the argument.
Even if we can only identify the correct profile up to a class of profiles related by an auto-
morphism of the value structure, and even if the social welfare functional does not assign
the same ordering to all profiles in this class, it will still surely agree on the ordering of some
alternatives (e.g., by applying axioms like Strong Pareto and Separability).
One might, however, take the apparent indistinguishability of value structures to have
metaphysical implications. Onemight claim that profiles related by an automorphism of the
value structure cannot represent distinct possibilities. On this view, the problem isn’t that
we might not know the correct profile, but rather that there is no uniquely correct profile—
only a correct class of profiles. This is analogous to influential “comparativist” claims in the
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metaphysics of quantities—e.g., that it is impossible for everything to be twice as massive
as it actually is, or to be located two feet to the right of where it actually is (Dasgupta 2013;
for discussion, see Wolff 2020; Sider 2020; Baker 2020; Martens 2021). These claims are
often motivated by appealing to the alleged indistinguishability of possibilities related by a
universal doubling ofmass facts or a static Leibniz shift. Onemight similarly reason from the
apparent indistinguishability of value profiles related by an automorphism to the claim that
there is really no difference between such profiles. This argument seems to get at the heart
of the issue: they do not, contrary to Sen (1977)’s comment on the invariance conditions
and Morreau and Weymark (2016)’s critique of the standard framework, represent different
ways the value facts could be.
There is a crucial difference, though, between the arguments for comparativism about
physical quantities and the argument for Automorphism Invariance. Arguments for com-
parativism that appeal to the empirical undetectability of uniform scalings assume that the
physical laws are such as to make those scalings undetectable. The physicists tell us the laws,
and we can then figure out what kinds of transformations would indeed be undetectable
based on those laws. But, in the context of social welfare evaluation, the laws are the very
things up for debate; we do not know them in advance. If it is assumed that the social wel-
fare functional satisfies Automorphism Invariance, then we will not be able to distinguish
between value profiles based on the overall betterness orderings assigned to them. Other-
wise, though, we could perhaps distinguish two profiles precisely on the grounds that they
ought to be assigned different overall betterness orderings.
This applies also to the earlier, purely epistemic argument. That argument assumes that
we can only know the ordering of alternatives by inferring it from knowledge the correct
profile and the social welfare functional. On a different picture, we can have reason to believe
that some alternative is better than another without first knowing howwell off each person is
in each alternative, and we can appeal to such judgments in trying to determine the correct
social welfare functional and value profile. This is compatiblewith thinking that the ordering
of alternatives is explained by how well off each person is in each alternative, since the order
of explanation need not be the same as the order of inference.
But even if we grant the premise of indistinguishability, the general inference from in-
distinguishability or undetectability to the metaphysical impossibility of distinctness does
not seem compelling. We are unable to distinguish between possibilities in which there is
an external world and those in which the appearance of an external world is generated by an
evil demon. But this doesn’t lead us to think that there is no difference between such worlds
27
(Schaffer 2005). So why should we conclude that two value profiles cannot represent dis-
tinct metaphysical possibilities merely on the grounds that we could not possibly tell which
one is actual? Perhaps we have reason, ceteris paribus, to disprefer theories that posit un-
detectable welfare facts to theories that do not (as Dasgupta 2013 suggests of undetectable
physical structure). This would give us reason to prefer social welfare orderings that satisfy
Automorphism Invariance to those that do not, when other things are equal. But this is
far from the decisive constraint that social choice theorists have characterized the standard
invariance conditions as being.
Furthermore, even if we grant that profiles related by an automorphism of the value
structure cannot represent distinct metaphysical possibilities, it would not follow that we
must accept Automorphism Invariance. We do not need to think of value profiles as meta-
physically possible ways the evaluative facts could be. They could also represent merely epis-
temic possibilities. Indeed, the multi-profile methodology of social choice theory is usually
justified by appeals to ignorance, not metaphysical contingency. Even if two metaphysically
possible worlds cannot be related by a universal doubling of mass facts, one’s knowledge
might leave one unable to rule out the epistemic possibility that everything has twice the
mass that it (unbeknownst to one) actually has—just as one might not be in a position to
know whether water is H2O or XYZ even though, whichever it is, it could not possibly have
been the other. If profiles represent merely epistemically possible assignments of values, we
should leave open the possibility that such profiles could be assigned different orderings by
the social welfare functional.
For these reasons, the case for Automorphism Invariance does not seem to me decisive.
This is not to say, of course, that any violation of Automorphism Invariance is perfectly wel-
come. For a particularly grotesque example, suppose that we have amerely intrapersonal or-
dinal value structure and that each person’s values can be represented by real numbers. Con-
sider the following social welfare ordering, which violates Invariance to Individual-Specific
Increasing Transformations: there are utility functions u1(⋅), . . . ,un(⋅) from V1, . . . ,Vn to










This rule compares alternatives by choosing a particular utility function for each person
and then adding up utilities. This seems to reify an arbitrary numerical representation of
an ordering—indeed, of n orderings—as a part of normative reality. Surely, no morally sig-
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nificant relation could be captured by this social welfare ordering, much as an ordering of
objects by the sums of their mass-in-grams and height-in-inches could not have any empir-
ical significance.
This is a particularly ugly violation of Automorphism Invariance because it involves as
many special levels as there are values. But I think it would be a mistake to infer from this
ugliness that there cannot be any special levels and that Automorphism Invariance must
hold in full generality. Social welfare functionals that satisfy Automorphism Invariance are,
I admit, more parsimonious than those that violate it. They do not require special values or
intervals, or possibly undetectable welfare facts. Parsimony, however, is just one theoretical
consideration among others. Elegant theories are better than ugly theories. But true theories
are better than false ones, however elegant. If we have strong independent reason to accept
a theory that violates the invariance conditions, we should not reject it out of hand.
A WelfarismTheorem
A qualitative social welfare functional with an unrestricted domain satisfies Pareto Indiffer-
ence and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives if and only if it is welfarist—i.e., there is a
social welfare ordering ≽∗ on∏ni=1Vi (the set of all value vectors) such that, for any profile
V and alternatives x, y ∈ X: x ≽V y⇔ V(x) ≽∗ V(y).8
Proof. Suppose that the domain is unrestricted and that the social welfare functional satisfies
Pareto Indifference and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. Define ≽∗ on ∏ni=1Vi as
follows: for any v,w ∈ ∏ni=1Vi, let v ≽∗ w iff there is some profile V and alternatives x, y ∈
X such that V(x) = v, V(y) = w, and x ≽V y. Since the domain is unrestricted, for any
v,w ∈ ∏ni=1Vi, there must be some profile V and alternatives x, y ∈ X, such that V(x) = v
and V(y) = w. Since ≽V is an ordering, either x ≽V y or y ≽V x. So ≽∗ is complete: for any
v,w ∈∏ni=1, either v ≽∗ w or w ≽∗ v.
Now suppose that v ≽∗ w: for some profile V and x, y ∈ X such that V(x) = v and
V(y) = w, x ≽V y. We now show that, for any profile V′ and alternatives x′, y′ ∈ X such that
V′(x′) = v and V′(y′) = w, x′ ≽V′ y. Since the domain is unrestricted, there must be some
profile V′′ such that V′′(x) = V′′(x′) = v and V′′(y) = V′′(y′) = w. By Independence of
8The proof follows the same strategy as the proofs of Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 in Bossert and Weymark (2004:
1106f.). But it is worth reformulating in the qualitative framework to show that it doesn’t depend on any
distinctive features of the numerical framework—e.g., that individual utility functions have the same range, or
that their ranges are or even have the structure of the real numbers.
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Irrelevant Alternatives, x ≽V′′ y. By Pareto Indifference, x ∼V′′ x′ and y ∼V′′ y′. So, by the
transitivity of ≽V′′ , x′ ≽V′′ y′. And thus, by Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, x′ ≽V′ y′,
as desired.
To show that ≽∗ is transitive, suppose that u ≽∗ v ≽∗ w. There must be a profile U
and alternatives x, y, z such that U(x) = u, U(y) = v, and U(z) = w. The reasoning above
establishes that x ≽U y ≽U z. By the transitivity of ≽U, x ≽U z. So, by the definition of ≽∗,
u ≽∗ w.
The right-to-left direction—that a welfarist social welfare functional satisfies Pareto In-
difference and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives—is trivial.
B Characterizationof IntervalUtilitarianismvia IntervalAnonymity
Given a hybrid difference structure, a social welfare ordering satisfies Interval Anonymity
and Strong Pareto iff it is Interval Utilitarianism.
Proof. Consider two vectors v1 and v2 such that [v11v21]⊕ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⊕ [v1nv2n] ⪰ [a1a1]. Suppose for
contradiction that v1 ⋡∗ v2. By the completeness of ≽∗, this implies v2 ≻∗ v1.
Consider the permutation σ ∶ N → N such that σ(i) = i + 1 for all i ≠ n and σ(n) = 1.
For each i ∈ N and for any k > 1, there is a value vk+1i such that vki vk+1i ∼ vk−1σ(i)v
k
σ(i). By Interval
Anonymity, vk+1 ≻∗ vk for every k > 1, since we supposed that v2 ≻∗ v1. So, by the transitivity
of ≻∗, vn ≻∗ v1.
But this violates Strong Pareto, because v1i ⪰ vni for every i ∈ N. To see this, let σk(⋅)
denote the composition of σ with itself k times. For every i,
[v1i vni ] = [v1i v2i ]⊕ [v2i v3i ]⊕ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⊕ [vn−1i vni ]
= [v1i v2i ]⊕ [v1σ(i)v2σ(i)]⊕ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⊕ [v1σn−1(i)v
2
σn−1(i)]
= [v11v21]⊕ [v12v22]⊕ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⊕ [v1nv2n]
Thus, [v1i vni ] ⪰ [a1a1] for every i, so v1i ⪰ vni . By Strong Pareto, v1 ≽∗ vn, which contradicts
vn ≻∗ v1.
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